Controllers at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (KDCA) assigned no altitudes at all to helicopters over four days of operations last week, a National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine committee reviewing the capital’s airspace said yesterday in a webinar covering its report. The committee found the same deficiency in recordings from the Jan. 29, 2025 midair collision near KDCA, and during an earlier in-person visit to the tower.
Congress requested the study, and the committee based its conclusions on some 19,000 pages of FAA documents, interviews with agency personnel at multiple management levels, and visits to control towers and radar facilities. Its recommendations address airport capacity, FAA and Army risk management, and the layers of protection against midair collisions.
Michael McCormick, associate professor and air traffic management program coordinator at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, examined the tower’s helicopter control position four separate times. “Half the time, they did not issue proper clearances for the helicopters to operate within that airspace,” he said of the most recent observations.
McCormick, who spent 33 years in air traffic control and retired as v-p of management services in the FAA’s Air Traffic Organization, also found that controllers radar-identifying a helicopter were not validating the altitude shown on the tower display against what the aircraft was actually flying, a check that underpins the altitude separation standard they would then be applying. “This needs to change,” he said.
Those lapses compound a conflict in the governing paperwork that the committee found unresolved. The Baltimore-Washington helicopter route chart carries a note stating that altitudes will be assigned on contacting air traffic control, and the altitudes themselves are qualified. “In response to the accident, in part, what the FAA did was, they have inserted the word ‘should’ before every altitude that’s mentioned on this chart,” said Nancy Currie-Gregg, director of the Texas A&M University Space Institute and a retired U.S. Army colonel and master Army aviator.
In FAA usage, she noted, “should” denotes a non-mandatory requirement, while the agency reserves “must” for mandatory ones. Yet the Army’s letter of agreement with the FAA, still dated 2007 as of the committee’s report writing, states that the routes and altitudes on that chart must apply unless otherwise authorized by ATC. No standard governs route width either. McCormick tied the two findings together directly: the ambiguity in the charts and letters of agreement “is not rectified by the controllers when they’re providing actual air traffic control services within that airspace.”
Wesley Olson, lead of the Transportation Safety and Resilience Group at MIT Lincoln Laboratory, described a three-layer system for managing conflicts—strategic traffic flow and route design, separation provision by controllers or by pilots applying visual separation, and collision avoidance as the final backup—and said all three had gaps on the night of the accident. Helicopter routes exist in Washington, New York, Los Angeles, Dallas, and other metropolitan areas to ease navigation, he said, but were never designed to separate helicopters from IFR traffic, even though many pilots believed they were protected by the routes.
The now-obsolete Helicopter Route 4, flown at its maximum authorized altitude, offered no more than 75 feet of vertical clearance from an airplane landing on Runway 33, within the 75-foot tolerance to which crews confirm altimeter accuracy on the ground. Add ordinary helicopter altitude-keeping error and the fact that airplanes landing on Runway 33 are not required to hold a precise glide path, Olson said, and the route and the approach path intersected. The FAA removed the Hains Point-to-Wilson Bridge segment of Route 4 from its charts in March 2025, published revised area charts eliminating Route 4 north of the Wilson Bridge in October 2025, and in January issued an interim final rule adding a subpart to FAR Part 93 that permanently bars helicopters and powered lift in vertical-lift mode from the area except for narrowly defined essential operations.
The separation layer failed next. Visual separation was the norm on the route, Olson said, and is challenging in daylight and harder at night, when background lighting makes an airplane difficult to distinguish from a building, depth perception is limited, and distance judgments rest on light brightness that varies by aircraft type. The helicopter crew was flying at 200 feet above the river on night-vision devices, which restrict field of view, with multiple airplanes on final at different distances in the forward field of view.
The collision avoidance layer had gaps of its own: TCAS does not issue resolution advisories below 1,000 feet agl, a limit set at the request of the pilot community during the system’s development in the 1980s and 1990s because low-altitude advisories were distracting, and the Army helicopter carried no collision avoidance capability.
Capacity pressure runs underneath all of it. Opened as Washington National Airport in 1941 and bounded by the Potomac River on three sides and Arlington, Virginia, on the fourth, KDCA has three short intersecting runways, McCormick said, and its longest—Runway 1/19—often must accommodate both arrivals and departures. Slot controls require FAA authorization for every scheduled operation, but Congress has repeatedly raised the number of slots and granted perimeter rule waivers.
Committee analysis found departures compressed into 15-minute windows that stayed within the hourly limit while exceeding what the airport could handle, which is why the committee wants the FAA to adopt sub-hourly scheduling and wants Congress to require a safety assessment, not only a capacity analysis, before authorizing further increases. McCormick noted that the accident airplane was originally set up for Runway 1 and that the controller asked whether the crew could take Runway 33 instead: the longer path to the shorter runway “allows the controller more time and space to get an additional departure out.”
Time-based flow management, which was available at Potomac Tracon but unused before the collision, is now running at KDCA, and the committee wants its effectiveness analyzed.
Committee chair James Bagian, executive director of the Center for Risk Analysis Informed Decision Engineering at the University of Michigan, attributed the failure to recognize these risks to a compliance culture that stopped short of root causes. He offered an example from a July briefing, roughly 18 months after the accident: the FAA had found that KDCA tower controllers were not using required memory aids, responded by documenting that everyone had taken training explaining why memory aids matter, and did not examine whether performance changed.
A 2013 event that Bagian described as closely analogous to the 2025 accident produced no mitigation that would have prevented it, and when the committee asked the FAA to produce the root cause analysis it had been told was performed, the agency could not. The committee asked repeatedly for any root cause analysis and never received one; the FAA has since told it that root cause analysis training is planned. Organizational boundaries compounded the problem. Chart producers told the committee they do not have controllers and pilots review charts for operational usability, and there was no expectation that they would. One FAA official, Bagian said, told the committee the agency sometimes refers to its silos as “cylinders of excellence.”
On the Army side, Currie-Gregg said the preflight Risk Common Operating Picture for the accident flight rated crew selection, mission and environment, and weather each as medium risk, then downgraded the residual rating to low without the mitigations cited on the form clearly addressing the hazards that drove those ratings. The form identified controlled flight into terrain as the greatest risk to the flight; midair collision risk was not assessed anywhere on it. The committee recommends that the Army revise the tool to require explicit consideration of midair collision risk, that DOD require military aviators flying rotorcraft in the National Capital Region to demonstrate airspace proficiency periodically rather than once, and that the Army and FAA establish a recurring joint safety assurance process. Bagian said the committee’s questions to the Army on critical points drew an official response of declining to respond. “What that means is they refused,” he said.
Among the technical fixes, Olson said standards for ACAS XR, the rotorcraft variant of the next-generation collision avoidance system, were finalized this year and should reach FAA approval through a technical standard order next year, a step he urged be expedited, with an equipage mandate prioritizing rotorcraft in Class B airspace. He said ACAS XA, intended to replace TCAS, improves safety by 20% and cuts nuisance alerts by more than 65%, and added that mandates should be harmonized so equipage can occur during scheduled heavy maintenance.
For ADS-B In, he said the greatest benefit lies with aircraft lacking directive collision avoidance capability, and that congressional action would likely be required. Two days before the briefing, he noted, House Transportation and Infrastructure and Senate Commerce leaders announced a bipartisan agreement in principle to mandate ADS-B In on aircraft already required to carry ADS-B Out, combining the Senate’s ROTOR Act and the House-passed ALERT Act. The agreement is not law, and provisions covering military aircraft remain unresolved.
The committee’s second report will examine FAA staffing for system safety work, the maturity of a new FAA-wide risk organization, the Army’s safety system, other helicopter operations in the National Capital Region, and whether corrective actions already taken are working.
“This accident was not an isolated or unforeseeable event, but the foreseeable culmination of cascading systemic failures,” Bagian said. “The fundamental failure was not the absence of warning signs, but the organization’s inability to recognize, connect, and effectively act upon them.”