A former FAA safety inspector pleaded guilty to multiple federal felonies. He is accused of accepting bribe money he used to buy a Taylorcraft, paid in exchange for intentionally failing to conduct required inspections on a helicopter operator in Guam, Hansen Helicopters. The company's maintenance practices have been called into question by the NTSB. In an agreement with federal prosecutors revealed this week, Timothy Cislo pleaded guilty to three counts of honest services wire fraud. He could face up to $750,000 in fines and 20 years in prison.

Prosecutors charged Cislo with accepting funds from Hansen Helicopters or its representative in 2014, to purchase a Taylorcraft BC-12D with an estimated value of approximately $20,000. The money was paid in exchange for issuing and reissuing special airworthiness certificates for helicopters without performing the requisite inspections. In emails with Hansen employees, Cislo referred to these illegal certificate approvals as “sign-fests,” according to prosecutors. Hansen operates a fleet of Hughes/MD 369/OH-6s for a variety of missions, including fish-spotting throughout the Pacific for large Japanese tuna boats.

In late 2016, FBI agents raided Hansen facilities in Guam, Saipan, and Georgia, seizing airworthiness certificates, registrations, and logbooks for 15 of the company’s helicopters. They also confiscated several helicopters outright, including one being maintained by Hansen in the Philippines. This shut down most, but not all, of Hansen’s operations.

In February 2017, a Hughes 369A helicopter operated by a Hansen-affiliated company, “Jim’s Air Repair” (both companies have the same ownership nexus) based on the small island nation of Vanuatu, made a hard landing into the Pacific near Guam during a fish-spotting mission. The American pilot and the Japanese spotter survived with serious injuries, and the utility float-equipped helicopter was recovered.

Accident Highlights Maintenance Discrepancies

The NTSB accident report NTSB Identification: WPR17LA075 highlights several discrepancies. The pilot held only a third-class medical at the time of the crash and therefore was not qualified to fly commercially. The engine had 393.7 hours since last overhaul but the two hour meters inside the helicopter varied—one displayed a reading of 937.8 hours, and the other one displayed a reading of 1,245.9 hours—no one at Hansen seemed to know why. No fuel was observed in the fuel tank during the examination. The fuel pump power wire was not wrapped around the start pump fuel line, as it was required to be; this condition can result in an erroneous fuel quantity indication. In addition, the in-tank quantity sensor exhibited visible corrosion. A vacuum check of the engine fuel system indicated that there was a slow leak within the fuel system. During the check, systematic isolation of components traced the leak to a line that connected the fuel pump to the fuel control.

In addtion, there was a lot of water in the fuel system, and it was unlikely that it was as a result of the water landing. As the NTSB noted, “The fuel system architecture precluded introduction of water into either the fuel pump or the FSN fuel line unless the engine was operating.” The Board found the “evidence was consistent with the water being present in the helicopter fuel system before the flight.”

Hansen declined to make the helicopter’s mechanic available to NTSB investigators or to provide an accounting of his qualifications. The company’s director of maintenance supplied the NTSB with maintenance records, flight records, and 337 forms. The NTSB wrote, “Exclusive of the 337 forms, none of the contents conformed to the FAA maintenance entry requirements. The records contained multiple internal service time and/or component number discrepancies. According to the FAA inspector, cursory comparisons of the 337 forms with the records on file with the FAA in Oklahoma City revealed numerous discrepancies. The most recent recorded 100-hour/annual, 300-hour, or 600-hour inspection was completed and signed off by the Hansen Helicopters DOM on 5/7/16. On that inspection entry, the airframe time was listed as 6,891.1 hours, and the ‘Hobbs time’ was listed as 544.1 hours. The inspection entry stated 'Next inspection due is a 100 hour at 6991.1 [hours].' However, despite the fact that all available information indicated that the helicopter has accumulated nearly 400 hours since that inspection, no additional FAA-compliant inspection entries were observed for dates subsequent to 5/17/16.”

Although Hansen Helicopters filed the accident report, it maintained that it merely provided employment recruiting, training, and logistical support for Jim’s Air Repair of Vanuatu.

Hansen Helicopters recorded two fatal crashes in the late 1990s. In a 1997 accident, the NTSB found that a non-repairable trim switch had been disassembled and reassembled. In an accident a year earlier, the Board found that tail-rotor control was lost due to improper maintenance.